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LEGAL PROBLEMS AFFECTING INTERSTATE
TRANSPORTATION AGENCIES
THOMAS J. ERNST*
INTRODUCTION
Informed citizens or current transit operators are very familiar
with the litany of practical problems and complaints associated with
day-to-day city bus operations. Discourteous drivers, poor schedule
adherence, and inadequate public information systems are just a few
difficulties surrounding interstate transportation agencies.
In addition to those daily troubles encountered by urban bus
riders, transit companies themselves are engulfed in a myriad of
crises ranging from bankrupt private companies to higher fares for
fiscally shaky New York City's transit system, and to the much less
patronized but technologically innovative BART' system in San
Francisco. It is disturbing that similar problems face interstate
transportation agencies as they grapple with (a) conflict of laws
issues;2 (b) equity concerns' raised under Title VI of the Civil Rights
*Member of the Missouri Bar and Program Development Director of the
Missouri-Illinois Bi-State Develpment Agency.
1. The Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) subway system spent over $4 billion
to build an extensive tunnel structure under San Francisco Bay and beneath much of
that northern California metropolitan region. Space-age computer technology was
utilized to schedule and control BART's new subway cars, to collect and analyze a com-
plex series of transit fares, and to transport approximately 130,000 passengers on a
given weekday. The BART structure was completed and opened in 1976.
2. Conflict of laws issues arise in the following situations; (1) A maze of state
laws and local ordinances affect most interstate transit operations as one state's
license fees or gasoline taxes are paid by fares collected from transit riders in the
neighboring states. (2) With every major transit operation in America requiring large
public subsidies, local matching funds from one state are used to pay insurance
premiums covering accident settlements paid to compensate transit riders injured in
another state. (3) Restrictive fiscal strings are attached to capital assistance provided
by one state, necessitating the use of farebox revenues generated from operations in
the other state so local share matching requirments can be satisfied. This results in
the eventual purchase of transit buses and other vehicles with one state's revenues,
which vehicles are subsequently used in both states.
3. Most interstate public transit operations receive considerable amounts of
federal funds from the U.S. Department of Transportation's Urban Mass Transporta-
tion Administration (UMTA). The UMTA is "authorized and directed to effectuate" the
enforcement of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1974), which
provides in part:
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Act of 1964; (c) interestate compact matters;' and (d) one-person, one-
vote issues.'
TRADITIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS QUESTIONS
Regionalism is still a strong concept attractive to many
policymakers in interstate areas. Areawide transportation
authorities continue to be proposed' as the solution to metropolitan
traffic jams and gasoline shortages. Prior to the establishment of ad-
ditional interstate transportation agencies, urban leaders would do
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or na-
tional origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance. [Emphasis added.]
Clearly, interstate transit operations receiving such federal aid are therefore bound to
distribute their transportation benefits in a non-discriminatory manner.
4. Many interstate compact agencies are empowered to engage in public
transportation activities. Some interstate transit agencies (like the Bi-State Develop-
ment Agency serving the St. Louis region) are wholly dependent on interstate com-
pacts, approved by the affected states and ratified by the United States. Congress, for
virtually all their legal authority, revenue bonding, or note issuance powers. The
decision-making structure, ie., the governing board, chief executive, and table of
organization of such interstate transit agencies, is authorized and detailed in the in-
terstate compact.
Once such an interstate compact is ratified, the public transit agency is often
confronted by the regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission (I.C.C.). For a
short but excellent overview of the I.C.C. by its former General Counsel, see Cerra,
Federal Transportation Law in Your Practice-Beware of Proposed Changes, 33 J.
Mo. BAR 108 (March, 1977).
5. Decisions concerning the equitable distribution of transportation benefits
are made by the governing boards and management of some interstate transit agen-
cies. Unfortunately, not all transit service decisions are truly equitable. Discrimination
often exists in the allocation of transportation benefits. People in one state might
benefit from newer, cleaner buses not available on routes in the other state; or, certain
groups may benefit from very frequent fixed-route transit service or from personalized
door-to-door service provided by "Dial-A-Ride" mini-buses. Further, minority persons
may suffer from discriminatory and inferior transit service, whether intentional or de
facto.
Conceivably, such discrimination may be caused by the under-representation of
minority persons on the governing board or within the management staff, or it may
result from a voting imbalance on the governing board. Minority persons in one state
may outnumber the total of all persons from the other state within the transit service
area; yet, the less populated state may unfairly benefit from equal or greater voting
strength on the interstate governing board. Obviously, such a circumstance raises
serious "one person, one vote" questions.
6. One of the more interesting proposals along this line was suggested in AD-
VISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, IMPROVING URBAN AMERICA: IN-
FORMATION REPORT M-107 121 (September, 1976).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 [1977], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol11/iss3/3
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well to ponder the major legal problems involved in the formation
and subsequent operation of a new interstate transportation agency,
as conflict of laws issues will prove a problem to such an agency
from its inception.
Traditional conflict of laws questions arise quite often for an in-
terstate transit agency involved in numerous traffic accidents. The
number and severity of such accidents varies from one transit agen-
cy to another, depending upon several different factors, but even
the finest interestate transportation agency operating buses and
other transit vehicles cannot avoid involvement in some traffic ac-
cidents.
Should the victim of one of these accidents wish to bring suit
against the transit agency, an issue closely related with conflicts
questions will demand resolution: which of the concerned states or
the federal government has the proper jurisdiction to try such an
action? For instance, when the transit agency exists through an in-
terstate compact authority created pursuant to the compact clause
of the United States Constitution,' a traffic accident involving that
agency may result in a wrongful death action being brought against
the agency in the federal district courts.
A Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Yancoskie v.
Delaware River Port Authority,' appears to offer some relief for in-
terstate agencies from suits alleging federal jurisdiction. Yancoskie
was brought by a construction worker's widow whose husband fell
to his death while working on an interstate bridge being built for
the Delaware River Port Authority. Similarly, it is not difficult to
imagine a bus traffic accident on an interstate bridge between the
two states involved in the creation of the transit agency. Now,
however, whether a wrongful death action or a simple traffic acci-
dent, the impact of Yancoskie seems to be that interstate agencies
cannot be successfully sued by plaintiffs who allege that the incident
is a federal question and that jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. §§
1331 or 1337. Nor, if the Yancoskie decision prevails, can plaintiffs
7. Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution provides in part:
No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of
tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any
agreement or compact with another State or with a foreign power, or
engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as
will not admit of delay.
8. 528 F.2d 722 (3d Cir. 1975).
9. Some actions involving interstate commerce are permitted under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1337 (1976) without regard to any minimum monetary amount if the actions are found
to be "arising under federal law."
19771
Ernst: Legal Problems Affecting Interstate Transportation Agencies
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1977
354 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11
contend that actions against interstate compact agencies, establish-
ed with the consent of Congress," are given federal jurisdiction via
the Federal Tort Claims Act." Yancoskie indicates that such suits
are not available against the federal government simply because it
approved the interstate compact agencies. Instead, actions apparent-
ly should be brought in state courts against the interstate agencies
per se.
The theory behind bringing such actions in state courts has
been well-established by litigation. Citing the classic conflicts case of
Hess v. Pawloski,2 plaintiffs seeking jurisdiction in their friendly
native state would argue that buses
are dangerous machines, and, even when skillfully and
carefully operated, their use is attended by serious
dangers to persons and property. In the public interest
the state may make and enforce regulations reasonably
calculated to promote care on the part of all, residents
and non-residents alike, who use its highways. The
measure in question operates to require a non-resident to
answer for his conduct in the state where arise causes of
action alleged against him, as well as to provide for a clai-
mant a convenient method by which he may sue to en-
force his rights. 3
No less than a non-resident, the interstate transportation agency is
also subject to this jurisdictional standard.
Should a wrongful death action arise against the transportation
agency, the statute creating the action will generally determine the
appropriate plaintiffs. As might be expected, both the limit on
damages and the statute of limitations is also determined by the law
of the state where the action arose. Though the mode of transporta-
10. For an historical analysis of the establishment of interstate compacts, see
Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study In In-
terstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925). See also Comment, Congressional
Supervision of Interstate Compacts, 75 YALE L.J. 1416 (1966).
11. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346(b), 1402(b), 2401(b), 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680
(1965). See Steinbaum, Federal Question Jurisdiction to Interpret Interstate Com-
pacts, 64 GEo. L.J. 87 (1975).
12. 274 U.S. 352 (1927). See also Engdahl, Construction of Interstate Compacts:
A Questionable Federal Question, 51 VA. L. REV. 987 (1965).
13. 274 U.S. at 356. But see Comment, Implied Private Actions Under Federal
Statutes-The Emergence of a Conservative Doctrine, 18 WM.& MARY L. REV. 429
(1976).
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tion was different than mass transit, a recent truck-train accident in-
volving a Missouri railroad corporation and a Missouri citizen killed
by the corporation's train at a crossing in Texas resulted in the deci-
sion of State ex reL Broglin v. Nangle," which is illustrative of this
point. The court held that no Missouri interest controlled since
Texas law (1) created the wrongful death action, (2) defined ap-
propriate plaintiff beneficiaries, and (3) set the limit on damages.
In addition to bus accidents on interstate bridges and wrongful
death actions, conflict of law cases arise as the interstate authority
enters into contracts. In such cases, the interstate transportation
agency attempts to place limitations on the free exercise of jurisdic-
tion selection by the other contracting party and the courts of a cer-
tain state. For example, the Bi-State Development Agency, with half
of its Board of Commissioners from Illinois and With roughly twenty
percent of its transportation service area in Illinois, uses a standard
"governing law" clause in most of its contracts, which simply states
that "the contract shall be interpreted under and governed by laws
of the State of Missouri." "Governing law" clauses, by which the
parties agree to give exclusive jurisdiction to one state, sometimes
raise questions of mutuality and coercion regarding the contract. In
most cases, actual consent has been found and will suffice as the
legal basis for in personam jurisdiction if and when the interstate
agency would seek a judgment against an out-of-state contractor.
However, an interstate transit agency with operations in States X
and Y and a contract specifying X's statutes as governing law might
find Y courts not bound by this contractual constraint. For instance,
say a bus driver from State X signed a contract of employment with
the transit agency which specified that the laws of State X would
govern all matters relating to this employment. If the bus driver is
killed in State Y due to faulty brakes on his bus and his family br-
ings a wrongful death action relying on State Y's statute, limit on
damages and statute of limitations, a court of State X may follow
the example of State ex reL Broglin v. Nangle and apply State Y's
statute instead.
Conversely, the governing law specified by the interstate agen-
cy and a labor union may control wage or fringe benefit cases. A
tragic example follows: one of this writer's first duties after joining
an interstate transportation agency was to reach settlement with an
insurance firm and secure benefits for a widow of an employee who
had taken his own life. Suicide is no defense to payment under
14. 510 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. 1974).
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Missouri law15 and under this particular labor contract, unless the
company can show the insured employee intended suicide when he
applied for the insurance policy. The insured employee's domicile
generally dictates the law to be applied in such cases.
Generally, in workmen's compensation cases,"0 the interstate
transit agency's employment contract and the state in which the
personnel office is located when employment relationships begin in-
dicate which jurisdiction's law will govern. Yet, if the injury occurs
in the other state, or if the employee resides or usually works in the
other state, that state will likely seek to apply its own workmen's
compensation law with a judicious eye toward protecting its worker
citizens and their families against the interstate transit agency.
In another common conflict of laws area, that of multi-state
torts, an interstate transportation agency owes a very high standard
of care to all its riders. 7 With millions of riders each year, interstate
transit companies, as common carriers often subject to control by
the Interstate Commerce Commission (I.C.C.),8 must take cognizance
of Prosser's analysis of their potential tort liabilities. Prosser notes
that:
Common carriers, who enter into an undertaking toward
the public for the benefit of all those who wish to use
their services, must use great caution to protect
passengers entrusted to their care; and this has been
described as "the utmost caution characteristic of very
15. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.620.
16. For typical cases and fact situations, see Steinbaum, Federal Question
Jurisdiction to Interpret Interstate Compacts, 64 GEo. L.J. 87 (1975); Comment, Im-
plied Private Actions Under Federal Statutes-The Emergence of a Conservative
Doctrine, 18 WM. & MARY L. REv. 429 (1976).
17. See, e.g., Philadelphia and Reading R. Co. v. Derby, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 468
(1852).
18. The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1959), forbade
excessive or discriminatory rates ane other unfair practices by railroads and created
the Interstate Commerce Commission to administer the law. Today the I.C.C.'s
authority covers all interstate motor carriers. The carriers regulated by the
I.C.C.-such as trains, ships, trucks, buses, pipelines and the companies operating
them-fall into two general classes: (1) common carriers, which offer their services to
the public generally, and (2) contract carriers, which carry only certain goods or per-
sons. Most interstate transit agencies are classified as common carriers. However,
those "[m]otor vehicles used solely for transportation within a single municipality, con-
tiguous municipalities, or a zone adjacent to and commercially part of any
municipality" are excluded from the I.C.C.'s regulatory jurisdiction. Cerra, Federal
Transportation Law in Your Practice-Beware of Proposed Changes, 33 J. Mo. BAR
108, 110 (March, 1977). See 49 U.S.C. § 303(b)(9) (1963).
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careful prudent men," or "the highest possible care consis-
tent with the nature of the undertaking."'9
Still another conflict and choice of law problem area is raised
by the transit agency's ownership of real property. Bus garages,
repair shops, loop sites, timed transfer centers, transit malls, auto-
intercept facilities and park-ride lots are typical of the kinds of real
property owned by such an interstate body. Usually, issues affecting
real property will be governed by the law of the state in which the
property is located, i.e., the site of the bus facility."0
Though such traditional conflict of laws problems are in-
variably complex, such matters are sometimes the least of dif-
ficulties facing an interstate transit agency. Other troublesome tran-
sit issues are examined in the following sections.
EQUITY IN INTERSTATE TRANSIT-TITLE VI CONCERNS
Discrimination continues to be a serious problem in the alloca-
tion of transportation resources, primarily because the actual, every-
day delivery of services is controlled by low-level supervisory per-
sonnel who often are insensitive to Title VI matters and the transit
needs of minority persons. Assignment of older transit coaches,
selection of bus passenger shelter sites, and routing of particular
local bus lines are just three examples of areas in which discrimina-
tion occurs.
Title VI problems can be acerbated when an interstate transit
agency serves minority residents of two different states. Obviously,
transit services cost considerably more than farebox revenues
generated, and no major interstate or local bus system operates
without a subsidy. Additional financial operating assistance usually
comes to an interstate agency from at least two different sources:
one is Section 5 operating assistance grants authorized under the
Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964,2 and the other usual sub-
sidy sources are the two or more states involved in the interstate
transit operations.
19. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 34 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes
omitted).
20. See generally G. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 342-53 (3d
ed. 1963).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970), prohibits discriminatory practices in federally
funded programs.
22. 49 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976), establishes an aid program for urban mass
transportation agencies.
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Funding through different sources raises enormous equity and
Title VI concerns when one state, with a large minority population,
pays only a relatively small portion of transit operating costs. Simp-
ly put, how can an interstate transportation agency receiving the
bulk of its funds from one state provide adequate, equitable transit
service to minority persons in another state? The amounts of sub-
sidy from each state and the levels of operating assistance received
in relation to farebox revenues generated in each state have a
tremendous impact on the planning and service delivery processes.
Imagine that State X, with 250,000 minority persons, con-
tributes $30 million in operating assistance to an interstate transit
agency. State Y, with a minority population of 100,000, contributes
only $7 million to the transit agency. How can minority persons in
State Y receive the same quality and quantity of transit service as
minority people in State X? To paraphrase questions raised by
former UMTA23 Administrator Patricelli:
-How accessible are major medical centers and shopping
centers in State X to transit-dependent minorities and
women living in State Y?
-Are multiple transfers necessary for these basic trips?
Are expensive, non-stop, direct bus lines the only way to
equitably serve State Y's minority population?
-Can inner city residents in State Y get to the suburbs
in State X where the majority of jobs exist? Or, are they
prevented from obtaining adequate jobs because there is
no way to get them there easily and inexpensively?"
To answer such questions, the UMTA has funded three studies
to develop and refine criteria, qualifications, measures and tech-
niques for Title VI pre-award reviews.25 This author is Project Direc-
tor of one such study now being performed in the St. Louis region,
encompassing transit service areas in Missouri and Illinois.
Title VI criteria for the St. Louis/Bi-State region relating to the
equity of service provided by an interstate transportation agency
has now been developed. The term "equity" implies the comparison
23. The legal powers of the Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UM-
TA) are detailed in 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1612 (1976). Most federal funds to interstate tran-
sit agencies are administered and awarded by the UMTA.
24. Quoted in Williams, Public Transportation and the Protection of Civil
Rights, TRANSIT JOURNAL 25 (August, 1976).
25. Id. at 27.
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of one group with another. In this case, the factor compared is the
service offered to the minority and transit-dependent population in
contrast to that offered to other residents of the Bi-State service
area. Each of the Title VI criteria is being addressed by developing
data and analyses through specific measures of performance. These
measures of an equitable transit system are listed below:
Criteria
Subsidy
Coverage
Transferring
Duration
Frequency
Fare
Trip Time
Trip Speed
Accessibility
Accident
Exposure
Crime Exposure
Vehicle Loading
Waiting Facilities
Measures
amount of subsidy available per
capita, per rider, per service unit
(e.g., vehicle mile), per cost unit (i.e.,
percent of cost that is unsubsidized).
zero-car households served (peak).
route to route transfer movement re-
quirements (by distance).
aero-car households served (off-peak,
Saturday and Sunday).
lines exceeding or failing the stan-
dard average rider waiting time.
per trip, per mile, and by total
farebox support indices.
travel time compared to highway
travel time.
trip speed distribution.
accessibility indices (cost and/or time,
peak, non-peak).
accident rate by garage, route (com-
pared with total vehicle accidents in
the same area), and driver experience
by garage and route.
dot map of location of crimes on buses
or at bus stops compared to the am-
bient rate of crimes against persons.
maximum load count or seats by
route and location on the route, and
any available data on buses bypassing
stops because of overloading.
selective small sample of bus stop and
shelter location and condition em-
phasizing major transfer and load
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Predictability
Bus Age
Bus Cleanliness
Public
Information
locations and stops serving high
percentages of elderly and/or han-
dicapped.
selective review of existing and new
load and schedule adherence checks.
average age of assigned vehicle
weighted by the hours of service in
peak and non-peak traffic.
sample of bus cleanliness and physical
appearance by garage.
review of advertising and public in-
formation methods and media used;
general review of complaint records
and procedures.
Several authors recently noted the importance of distinguishing
between a conventional bus system as in the St. Louis interstate
region and rapid rail systems elsewhere. The transit service
characteristics "have significant influence on the approaches that
are suitable for quantifying the benefits.""6  While research
methodologies and techniques would probably be similar in analyses
of conventional bus or rapid rail systems, the overall study approach
is different. For example, compare a legal Title VI review with
traditional economic indices:
Title VI Transit
Beneficiary
Minority Persons27
Transit Dependents
Disabled Persons 8
Elderly Persons'
Traditional Economic Transit
Beneficiary
Constant Transit Users
Nondiverted Auto Drivers
Auto Drivers and Passengers
Diverted to Transit
Using such indices to measure service to transit dependents, in-
terstate transportation agencies like other governmental entities
26. Chatterjee and Sinha, Distribution of Benefits of Public Transit Project,
TRANSPORTATION ENGINEERING J. 511 (August, 1976).
27. In the St. Louis study, minority groups have been defined as Blacks,
American Indians and Spanish-speaking population subgroups. The UMTA's Office of
Civil Rights has approved this definition.
28. See Section 16(d) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 as amend-
ed, 49 U.S.C. § 1612 (1976).
29. Generally this term applies to those persons 65 years of age or older; no
federal statutory definition exists as of May, 1977.
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are bound to equal protection standards pursuant to Title VI. Yet
transit services, like high school educational services, are rather dif-
ficult to measure in terms of equal protection. While invidious
discrimination in access and opportunity to utilize transit services
must be carefully avoided, this criteria and its actual success in
eliminating or avoiding discrimination is often the subject of judicial
direction.
In his dissent in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,8" Mr. Justice Marshall wondered "how judicially
manageable standards are to be derived for determining how much
education is 'enough' to excuse constitutional discrimination ...
what level of education is constitutionally sufficient."'" In an in-
terstate transit agency, one might properly paraphrase Justice Mar-
shall's questions to ask "how much transit service is enough" and
"what level of transportation benefits is constitutionally sufficient."
As a lawyer and Project Director of the prototype of St. Louis
study, this author continues to adhere to Justice Marshall's dictum
that "[tihe Equal Protection Clause is not addressed to the minimal
sufficiency, but rather to the unjustifiable inequalities of state ac-
tion." 2 Consequently, the whole purpose of the Title VI study in the
St. Louis region is for outside independent consultants to develop
empirical evidence regarding actions by the interstate agency which
may later be found to violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Accordingly, measurable standards and judicially manageable
standards have been developed in the St. Louis study. Seventeen
criteria cited earlier" have been developed (though not yet weighed)
to assess (1) how much transit service is sufficient; (2) what level of
transit service is constitutionally sufficient; (3) what unjustifiable in-
equalities in transit service now exist; and, (4) what actions should
be immediately taken to correct inequity.
Using such criteria, one should properly ask: "Is transit service
a sufficient 'fundamental interest' to be protected under the United
States Constitution by the Supreme Court?" The Court per Chief
Justice Burger held in-Dandridge v. Williams ' that plaintiffs' in-
terest in getting welfare money was not fundamental. That same
30. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
31. Id. at 89.
32. Id
33. See note 25.supra and accompanying text.
34. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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Court in Richardson v. Belcher 5 and Jefferson v. Hackney" con-
tinued to hold social security-related and welfare benefits were not
fundamental interests. One could conclude that the majority of
justices do not consider food, clothing, shelter or transit service as
fundamental for equal protection purposes.
Yet, application of Title VI requirements mandates equal pro-
tection. Any interstate transit agency receiving federal funds must,
pursuant to Title VI, provide transportation benefits in a non-
discriminatory manner. In the absence of more explicit and
definitive legislative or judicial standards for resolving Title VI dif-
ficulties, such transit authorities will continue to be plagued with
the problem of allocating fairly their funds interstate and still pro-
viding reasonable service for all the passengers served.
Further, there seems to be a great deal of merit in mandating
"social impact" or Title VI studies as a prerequisite for receipt of
federal transit assistance funds. Each interstate transit agency
should be required to conduct a Title VI study comparable to the St.
Louis prototype analysis. Such a bureaucratic regulation would be
similar to environmental impact statements required by the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act." The profound impact of federally
funded transit operations on transit-dependent and minority persons
should be carefully measured prior to any major future expenditures
of federal transit funds. The Urban Mass Transportation Act should
be amended to include "social impact" statutory language similar to
that mandating environmental impact analyses in the National En-
vironmental Policy Act. 8
FORMATION OF INTERSTATE TRANSIT AGENCIES
In addition to considering fundamental interests, Title VI ques-
tions, and different equity problems, those interested in operating
interstate service or forming an interstate transportation agency in
the late 1970's or 1980's should look back to the case of Virginia v.
Tennessee 9 Mr. Justice Field, writing for the Court, asked ques-
tions which modern transit planners might ask:
If, then, the terms "compact" or "agreement" in the con-
stitution do not apply to every possible compact or agree-
35. 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
36. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4335 (1973).
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331, 4332 (1973).
39. 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
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ment between one state and another, for the validity of
which the consent of Congress must be obtained, to what
compacts or agreements does the constitution apply? . . .
Looking at the clause in which the terms "compact" or
"agreement" appear, it is evident that the prohibition is
directed to the formation of any combination tending to
the increase of political power in the states, which may
encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the
United States. . . Compacts or agreements-and we do
not perceive any difference in the meaning, except that
the word "compact" is generally used with reference to
more formal and serious engagements than is usually im-
plied in the term "agreement"- cover all stipulations af-
fecting the conduct or claims of the parties."0
Historically, interstate compacts have often been used by ad-
joining states to improve transportation. In 1921, New York, New
Jersey, and the United States joined in a compact to erect the Port
of New York Authority. This authority is the planning and ad-
ministrative agency for the entire port of New York.
This author is most familiar with the legal basis for his own
agency, which was carefully modeled after the New York region's in-
terstate compact. On September 20, 1949, a compact was entered in-
to by the states of Missouri and Illinois, which compact has since
been amended in certain respects. As presently in force, key por-
tions of the compact follow:
ARTICLE II
To that end the two states create a district to be known as the
"Bi-State Metropolitan Development District" (hereinafter referred
to as "The District") which shall embrace the following territory:
The City of St. Louis and the counties of St. Louis and St. Charles
and Jefferson in Missouri, and the counties of Madison, St. Clair,
and Monroe in Illinois.
ARTICLE -III
There is created the Bi-State Development Agency of the
Missouri-Illinois Metropolitan District (hereinafter referred to as the
Bi-State Agency) which shall be a body corporate and politic. The Bi-
State Agency shall have the following powers:
40. Id. at 519-20.
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1. To plan, construct, maintain, own and operate bridges, tun-
nels, airports and terminal facilities and to plan and establish
policies for sewage and drainage facilities;
2. To make plans for submission to the communities involved
for coordination of streets, highways, parkways, parking areas, ter-
minals, water supply and sewage and disposal works, recreational
and conservation facilities and projects, land use pattern and other
matters in which joint or coordinated action of the communities
within the areas will be generally beneficial;
3. To charge and collect fees for use of the facilities owned
and operated by it;
4. To issue bonds upon the security of the revenues to be
derived from such facilities; and, or upon any property held or to be
held by it.
In addition to review of just a few of the many powers granted
the interstate agency under the Missouri-Illinois interstate compact,
those considering interstate transit problems should examine other
interstate compacts, which now number well over one hundred for-
mal agreements ratified by Congress. C. Herman Pritchett provided
one of the best, most concise historical overviews of the interstate
compact formation process. He stated:
Although congressional consent to interstate com-
pacts is required, there is no set formula as to when and
how that approval should be registered. The assent may
be given before or after the agreement; it may be explicit,
implicit, or tacit. Nor is there any form in which Congress
must cast its approval. It may be done by specific statute,
by a joint resolution, by ratification of a state constitution
which contains such a compact or by means of a compact
between Congress and the states involved. Congress may
even extend blanket approval to future agreements in cer-
tain specified areas.
No case has arisen in which a compact has been held
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Once a state has
formally ratified a compact and the approval of Congress
has been obtained, the agreement is binding on the state
and all its officers- executive, legislative, and judicial. A
state cannot unilaterally declare that a compact is in viola-
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tion of its constitution and use this as a basis for
withdrawal."
While this historical overview is enormously helpful to those
interested in interstate agreements, the more mundane, practical
factor of funding also warrants study. An interstate compact agency
without sufficient fiscal resources is unable to fulfill its compact pur-
poses, and such a financially weak agency is hardly worthy of emula-
tion or further legal analysis.
FISCAL CONSIDERATIONS
When considering formation of an interstate transit agency, a
formal compact seems worthwhile unless very limited and expensive
charter operations to the other state are planned. Very large
amounts of federal aid now come to interstate compact transit agen-
cies through Section 542 of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of
1964, as amended.
Section 5 greatly benefits those interstate transit agencies
operating through a single entity. The larger the population, the
more Section 5 funds are available to the interstate transportation
operator. Key portions of Section 5's statutory language indicate
that nearly $4 billion is available for distribution through fiscal year
1980:
(b)(1) The Secretary shall apportion for expenditure in
fiscal years 1975 through 1980 the sums authorized by
subsection (c). Such sums shall be made available for ex-
penditure in urbanized areas or parts thereof on the basis
of a formula under which urbanized areas or parts thereof
will be entitled to receive an amount equal to the sum of
(A) one-half of the total amount so apportioned
multiplied by the ratio which the population of
such urbanized area or part thereof, as
designated by the Bureau of the Census, bears
to the total population of all the urbanized areas
in all the States as shown by the latest
available Federal census; and
(B) one-half of the total amount so apportioned
multiplied by a ratio for that urbanized area
41. See C.H. PRITCHETT, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 109 (1968), referring to
West Virginia ex reL Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951), on this particular aspect of his
analysis of interstate compact agencies.
42. 49 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976).
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determined on the basis of population weighted
by a factor of density, as determined by the
Secretary.
As used in the preceding sentence, the term "density"
means the number of inhabitants per square mile.
(c)(1) To finance grants under this section, the Secretary
may incur obligations on behalf of the United States in
the form of grants, contracts, agreements, or otherwise in
an aggregate amount not to exceed $3,975,000,000.
A recent study by the Northwestern Indiana Regional Planning
Commission provides an excellent explanation of the basic provision
of the operating assistance portion of this important federal law:
Operating Assistance- Section 5 of the Urban Mass
Transportation Act, as amended, provides money to ur-
banized areas (urban places of more than 50,000 popula-
tion) through a formula based on population and popula-
tion density. The total sum of money which goes to each
of these urbanized areas each year may be used for either
operating purposes or for capital improvement purposes.
How the money is to be utilized is strictly a matter of
local option. If the money is used for operating aid, it is on
a fifty-fifty basis; if the funds are used for capital im-
provements it is on an 80 percent federal and 20 percent
local basis.
There are a number of provisions that must be met
before the money allocated under Section 5 can be used on
the local level for either capital or operating purposes. Re-
quirements under Section 5 include civil rights agree-
ments, labor protection clauses, assurance of local mat-
ching funds, maintenance of the local financial support ef-
forts based on the average support of the past two years,
street traffic managemeent plans, efficiency standards and
transit energy conservation plans and programs.
In essence, the operating subsidy is an add-on. A city
that has had a maintenance of effort level averaging
$100,000 over the past two years is eligible for $100,000 of
federal money. The major aim of the subsidy provision of
the Act is, therefore, to help in the improvement of ser-
vice or to help maintain existing fare levels or, perhaps,
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lower fares. The subsidy money may be used to cover the
expenses of any legitimate operating purpose.'"
As comparative examples of the distribution of Section 5
assistance, Northwest Indiana recieves a sub-allocation of the total
amount allocated on the formula basis to the Chicago-Northwest In-
diana region by the UMTA. The allocation within the region is the
result of an agreement among participants in the regional transpor-
tation planning board. By contrast, in the St. Louis Bi-State
Missouri-Illinois compact situation, the interstate transit agency
receives funds allocated to urbanized portions of both states. Ob-
viously, if citizens of both states receive adequate and equitable
transit service, the economic efficiency through a unified transit
system large enough to realize economies of scale is a tremendous
benefit to the interstate region. Moreover, administrative effec-
tiveness is greatly improved with unified planning and purchasing.
As highlighted in this section, the fiscal benefits of an in-
terstate transit agency to trasnportation users in a given area are
many. Yet, the establishment of such an agency raises the serious
constitutional and equitable problem of political accountability.
Disparities exist unavoidably throughout any interstate urbanized
region served by a transit agency in fiscal resources available for
collection, disbursement amounts needed to maintain a satisfactory
standard of service, and population density and usage levels. An
agency must be carefully organized and operated to effectively work
with these variables. The next section will examine the problems in-
volved in governing properly an interstate transit agency and satis-
fying the constitutional "one person, one vote" principle at the same
time.
THE ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE
PRINCIPLE APPLIED TO TRANSIT OPERATIONS
Interstate transportation agencies, like regional planning agen-
cies, will soon face legal challenges designed to bring these agencies
into compliance with the constitutional "one person, one vote"
prinicple. For example, in the St. Louis region the interstate
transportation unit is the Bi-State Development Agency," which is
43. Excerpted from NORTHWESTERN INDIANA REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION,
MASS TRANSPORTATION TECHNICAL STUDY: FISCAL YEAR 1975 (1975). See also 49 U.S.C.
§ 1604 (1976) for greater detail.
44. This is an interstate compact agency which legally emulates the New York
Port Authority. Construction of such an interstate compact agency's powers is a
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governed by a Board of Commissioners composed of five Missouri
and five Illinois residents. The powers of the Bi-State Development
Agency are considerable, including (1) eminent domain with the legal
concurrence of the municipal body affected, (2) the power to issue
revenue bonds, and (3) the authority to engage in activities beyond
the scope of operation of an interstate transit system. Such powers
are rather comparable to the board powers discussed in Hadley v.
Junior College District.5
A fictitious example perhaps can best illustrate the ramifica-
tions of the "one person, one vote" principle as it affects transit ser-
vices. Say that a given interstate region has a population of almost
2,400,000 people. According to the 1970 census nearly 1,800,000 peo-
ple, or approximately 75 percent of the region's population, are from
one state. Only 555,000 persons are residents of the other state. By
agreement between the involved states and approved by the federal
government, a transportation agency is established to serve the
needs of the entire region.
In this hypothetical situation, the ratio of population has re-
mained stable for at least thirty years before the interstate compact
establishing the transit agency was formed. Yet the interstate com-
pact gives residents of the less populous state the same number of
votes on the agency's governing board as are allocated residents of
the more populous state. The three-to-one population ratio is clearly
inconsistent with the equal voting division on the agency's govern-
ing board.
Such a governing board's even split along state lines appears to
violate the constitutional "one person, one vote" principle, given the
three-to-one population split in favor of the larger state. Does the in-
itial consent to the interstate compact by both state legislatures
justify such a large deviation from proportionate representation?
Does the subsequent congressional ratification of that same in-
terstate compact constitute a legitimate reason for such a huge
deviation?
Defenders of such deviations in interstate compact ar-
rangements would rely on Mr. Justice Marshall's majority opinion in
Abate v. Mundt," arguing that there is and was "a long history of,
federal question according to the holding in Yancoskie v. Delaware Port Authority, 528
F.2d 722 (3d Cir. 1975), and supported by the decision of Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri
Commission, 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
45. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
46. 403 U.S. 182, 186 (1971).
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and perceived need for, close cooperation" between the two states,
and this particular arrangement is the one most reflective of and
suitable for continuing that cooperative effort. On the other hand,
proponents of the larger state's interests who feel its vast popula-
tion majority should be reflected in the composition of the govern-
ing board can cite Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent in Abate, which
responds that it is not clear why such compact history "should alter
the constitutional command to make a good faith effort to achieve
equality of voting power as near to mathematical exactness as
possible."4 Further, proponents of the state with the substantial
population majority would likely cite dictum in the decisions of
Mahan v. Howell," upholding a 16.4 percent deviation from popula-
tion equality in voting strength, to the effect that while such a
percentage deviation "may well approach tolerable limits, we do not
believe it exceeds them."49 Likewise, in White v. Regester,50 the ma-
jority held a maximum deviation of 9.9 percent was "relatively
minor" and required no state justification.
What would motivate the majority state's plaintiffs? Since an
interstate compact has never been found unconstitutional, what are
the prospects for a successful challenge of the board composition of
an interstate agency?
The distribution of transit benefits and allocation of federal and
non-federal fiscal resources are two potential causes for litigation. If
one state consistently contributes less than its fair share of monies,
citizens of the other state are unduly burdened for transit services
never received. Transit operations in State Y could be as frequent,
with comparable equipment, with equally skilled drivers,
maintenance and supervisory personnel as those provided citizens of
State X. But if the citizens of State X are paying for eighty percent
or more of all operating cost, if state X is providing a dispropor-
tionate share of local monies to match federal capital resources,
litigation may result if the evenly divided Board of Commissioners
fails to act in rectifying this fiscal imbalance.
Conversely, perhaps the state providing most of the money is
receiving most of the benefits-all of the new buses, the bulk of new
passenger shelters, and all the new demand-response vehicles.
47. Id. at 189 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48. 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
49. Id. at 329.
50. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
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Under such circumstances, minority persons in the under-served
state may bring a Title VI equal protection action.
The important point for planners and appropriate officials to
note is that the problems raised in this hypothetical will almost cer-
tainly arise during the existence of any interstate transit agency.
Distribution of services and fiscal equity are two of the most
troublesome problems facing modern transit operators.
In litigating such situations, minority or under-served state
plaintiffs would rely on many of the Title VI cases cited earlier in
this article. Further, plaintiffs suing for lack of representative
voting rights would allege that the existence of "state action" is
established through the governmental processes needed to create
the interstate transit agency. The concept of "state action" has even
been applied to privately-owned transit operators. 1 However, like
the "fundamental interest" concept discussed earlier, more recent
Burger Court decisions indicate that mere state regulation or licens-
ing of private entities does not constitute state action. 5' Therefore,
direct Title VI actions, rather than "fundamental interest" or "state
action" suits, appear to offer the best chance of success when bring-
ing equal protection litigation involving an interstate transit agency.
CONCLUSION
The role of the transit industry in today's society is constantly
increasing in importance. Several decades ago, when streetcars and
trolleys passed out of active use and gasoline was plentiful and inex-
pensive, the availability and use of transit facilities was at its lowest
point. But recently the transit industry has been revived by massive
infusions of federal subsidies, especially since the late 1960's. Also,
as the energy crisis worsens and private transportation becomes
prohibitively expensive or unavailable, new transit agencies may
51. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 356 U.S. 715 (1961), wherein
state action was found when a private business was deemed an integral part of a
public building to public service; Public Utilities Commission v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451
(1952), in which the fact that a private transit company was regulated by a public agency
was sufficient to find state action; and Boman v. Birmingham Transit Company, 280
F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960), wherein the state action requirement was satisfied by the ex-
istence of an ordinance delegating the authority to regulate passenger seating to the
private carrier.
52. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Company, 419 U.S. 345 (1974), and
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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have to be formed and the service of existing ones expanded to han-
dle the increased demand. While each transit agency is necessarily
unique in its inception and in the special problems of the region it
serves, the questions examined in this article are common to all
transit operations and are therefore important to both concerned
private citizens as well as any organized groups interested in the
formation or subsequent evaluation of interstate compact transit
agencies.
All the various conflicts and choice of law problems affecting
interstate transit agencies in tort litigation and contract formation
must be recognized and anticipated. The legal aspects of public
fiscal assistance for the regional transit agency and the control exer-
cised over transit operations by the aid disbursing agency cannot be
overemphasized. Increasingly, federal aid is becoming the sine qua
non of public transportation. With those federal dollars come in-
creased legal responsibility to provide equitable service for transit
dependent and minority persons protected by Title VI. When new
interstate transportation compacts are formed or existing agencies
examined, the legal consequences of their voting and funding struc-
tures should also be evaluated.
How the future will affect the operation of interstate transit
agencies is uncertain. The incidence of conflicts of law cases will pro-
bably increase as the transit industry grows. Alternative sources of
funding may be necessary as revenues from gasoline taxes shrink.
The "one person, one vote" principle could be more strictly applied
to interstate transit compact agencies. And the way in which scarce
fuel resources are allocated within a transit agency may well
become an aditional source of Title VI discrimination suits. It is
hoped that the presentation of the basic legal concepts given in this
article will help in a small way to resolve the future transit pro-
blems as they arise.
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